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LEGAL FORUM 
• 
MMP: Aligning the Judicial and Parliamentary Functions 
. 
Peter Kiely* 
Introduction 
The advent of MMP may make a considerable difference to the way law is practised in New 
Zealand. It will change both the policy making environment and will ultimately change 
aspects of the legal environment. 
In essence, MMP is going to alter the distribution of public power in New Zealand. The 
changes in the way our system of government operates will have significant implications for 
the legislative process, decision making within the executive government and it is suggested, 
the role of judiciary and the legal profession. 
The focus of this paper is the possible impact of MMP on the alignment of our parliamentary 
and judicial functions. On the issue of policy making I will discuss the extent to which these 
roles may overlap and the desirability of such an occurrence. As a case study I will discuss 
the impact of judicial activism in the context of New Zealand's employment contracts 
legislation. Finally, I will examine the role of lawyers as advisors in the new regime. 
The impact of MMP on the alignment of our parliamentary and judicial 
functions 
As the implementation of MMP draws closer it is not easy to predict in precise ter·rns how the 
new system will function. However it seems to be accepted that generating policy changes 
and legislative amendments will become more difficult to achieve. This is because of the 
greater number of parties with decision making power, resulting in the need for greater 
consensus in decision making. There will be a shift in the balance of power from cabinet to 
parliament rendering it better able to bring the executive to account. The passage of legis-
lation is likely to be more fraught and less predictable. 
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11rixing of personnel and functions between the different institutions of gove1nment is 
IIICb that the doctrine of the separation of powers and the theory of checks and balances have 
most application to the judicial branch of the New Zealand Government The personnel of 
the judiciary do not hold office in the legislative or executive branches of government. 
Similarly the judiciary does not perfor1n executive or legislative functions. In short, it is not 
part of the judicial function for the courts to take issue with policy decisions implanented in 
lttdutory fo1m. The consequences of such actions offend against both the separation of 
powers principle and the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. 
I suggest that the extent to which an MMP system of government may blur the judicial and 
parliamentary functions is a matter for some concern. 
Earlier this year, His Honour, Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Ausbalia created 
a sto1m of debate by using his swearing in speech to outline what bas been interpreted as a 
manifesto of judicial activism and refo1m. His honour noted that there is now a greater public 
1mderstanding of the limited but very real scope for judicial creativity and legal 
development. 2 One academic commentator observed that "such an approach may be seen as 
exbeme and virulent. It amounts to judicial progressionis111 by which judges see themselves 
entitled to update the Constitution as the people are too stupid to change it at the 
referendums". 3 The extreme sentiment of this reply would possibly find favour with certain 
business groups in New Zealand who have expressed concern at examples of judicial activism 
I Palmer et al., "Practical Issues for Lawyers Arising from MMP", NZLS seminar, August 1995, 13. 
2 The Independent, ''New judge would usurp parliament's powers", 16 February 1996. 
l Supra at note 2. 
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affecting commercial interests. 4 Restraint and predicability are cardinal virtues for the 
business community and perceived inconsistency in the interpretation of the law has a real 
economic cost. 
In a recent publication prepared by the New Zealand Employers Federation and the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable the argument was made that the judiciary does not have 
authority to interpret legislation to make it accord more readily with its own policy 
conceptions than those of parliament. 
And therein lies the difficulty. It is undoubtedly the case that the role of the judiciary in our 
Wesbninster system of government is to interpret legislation in accordance with Parliament's 
intent. 
Perceived inconsistencies in that process undeJinine confidence in our system of gove~ument 
The degree to which this may continue or even be highlighted under the regime of MMP is 
problematic and a source of concern. 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 
To exemplify some of these issues I would now like to examine the impact of judicial 
• 
activism in the context of New Zealand's employment contracts legislation and the 
consequences this has had, and continues to have, on New Zealand's industrial relations. 
The arrival of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 ("ECA") capped a seven year 
programme of comprehensive economic liberalisation. The purpose of the Act was to move 
away from the traditional system of collective bargaining, centralised wage fixing and the 
control of working life by bureaucracy and pressure groups. 5 A controversial piece of 
legislation at its inception, that controversy has turned to the judiciary which has become 
increasingly activist in detertnining labour relations issues. 
The significant changes wrought by the ECA can be most clearly demonstrated by a 
comparison of the stated objectives of the new legislation to those of its predecessor. The 
purposes of the Labour Relations Act 1987 ("LRA") were: 
• To facilitate the formation of effective and accountable unions and effective and 
accountable employer organisations; 
• To provide procedures for the orderly conduct of relations between workers and 
employers; 
See, for example, "Employer wants Court abolished", The Dominion, 10 August 1992; Roger Kerr, 
"Employment Contracts Act undermined by judicial activism", The Independent, 14 May 1993; and 
"Employment Courts future under review", Evening Post, 17 September 1993. 
Kasper, "Free to work - The liberalisation of New Zealand's labour markets", The Centre for 
Independent Studies, 1996. 
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1bis case a three to two majority in the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the 
~ Court to award redundancy compensation pursuant to contracts which made no 
for it. The facts concerned four managerial employees who were · · for 
. It was not disputed that the employees were genuinely redundant. That is, their 
no longer existed within the company. 
made no reference to redundancy and there was no conttactMJal right for 
.. " .. for dis•nissal on that ground. Nevertheless the employees claimed compensation 
the ECA (s.40) framing the claim as a personal grievance by way of uqjuslifiable 
If the fact that the employees were generally redundant is combined with the fact that their 
·&&• contracts did not extend to redundancy, there is obvious difficulty in regarding 
the dismissals as unjustifiable. 
6 
7 
For a useful discussion of the burgeoning role of fairness see Harbridge and Kiely, "Activism and 
PassiviSJn: The Role of the Judiciary in the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act", Canadian Labour 
and Employment Law Journal, 3, nos. 4/5 1995. 
[1994] 2 ERNZ 243. 
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The only way in which the claim could succeed was for the court to modify the definition of 
"employment contract" in a manner which turned a lawful dismissal into one which was so 
unlawful as to bring the remedies of the Act into place. 
Clearly to do such a thing would be plain a instance of judicial legislation to reach a 
conclusion obviously contrary to the statutory intention, the agreement between the parties and 
the general law relating to implied ter1ns. 
The leading majority judgment was delivered by the President, Cooke P. His Honour invoked 
the doctrine of the implied ter1n, stating, "there is implied in a contract of employment a term 
that the employers will not without reasonable and probable cause conduct themselves in a 
manner calculated to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence 
between employer and employee". 8 
It is accepted law that an implied ter111 does not need to be implied to make the contract 
effective or elucidate any of its other terms. It exists to give business efficacy and must not 
contradict any other expressed tertn of the contract. 9 
To call a judicially imposed duty a "tertn of the contract" has the unfortunate consequence that 
in the guise of enforcing the contract the court may be in fact contradicting the contract in 
the pursuit of a different, unacknowledged object. More seriously, if an Act of Parliament 
is involved the court may be contradicting a statutory directive also. 
The majority held that redundancy compensation was payable to the dismissed employees. 
Arguably there was a degree of injustice exhibited towards the employer in the Brighouse 
decision. That a sanction was imposed on the employer for doing something he was entitled 
to do and a need for which was not his fault would appear illogical. 
As one of the dissenting judgments, Richardson J. noted that, "it is not open to the Courts to 
construct an extra statutory concept of social justice applicable in redundancy decisions." 10 
It has been argued that by introducing a false implied terrn into the employment contract the 
majority in Brighouse succeeded in contradicting the Act a well as the contract. In doing so 
the Court of Appeal exceeded the judicial function and placed itself above parliament in the 
forrnulation of social policy. 11 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Supra at note 7 at 252. 
BP Refinery (Western Port) Pty Limited v Hastings Shire Council (1977) 16 ALR 363; Devonport 
Borough Council v Robbins ( 1979) I NZLR I; Attorney General v New Zealand Post Primary 
Teachers Association ( 1992) I ERNZ 11636. 
Supra at note 7 at 258. 
Howard, "Interpretation of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ", New Zealand Business Roundtable 
and New Zealand Employers Federation, December 1995 at 12. 
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of the previous law in spite of the sharp change in stanltory policy. The report 
several conclusions and its recommendations were as follows: 
The need for the Employment Court as a separate j4•risdiction should be reviewed; 
The BCA should be amended to give proper weight to contlactual provisions in 
unjustifiable dismis.gl/personal grievance cases; 
Compensation for procedural ir1egularity and otherwise justifiable dis•t1issals should 
be limited; 
Non-contractual redundancy compensation should be abolished; 
The ECA should be amended to confirm the validity of fixed term contlacts; 
12 [1995] I ERNZ 281. 
13 Supra at note 12 at 308. 
14 Supra at note 11. 
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• The ECA should be amended to validate dismissal on contlactual notice. 
What I have discussed here is an area of the law in a state of flux. The ECA is still very 
much in its early stages. As I have outlined, the development of the law in the area of 
employment contracts has and is being subjected to an active judiciary and · political 
lobbying by concerned groups. I say it provides a microcos•n of what is to come as we 
approach the implementation of MMP. 
Foreign affairs and relations 
By way of contrast at a recent address the Minister for Foreign Affairs aad Trade, Daa 
McKinnon expressed his view that New Zealand's foreign policy will remain much as it · 
today under MMP. 15 He noted that wbat will change will be the influences and sources of 
foreign policy input. As a result, the challenge will be in maintaining our foreign policy 
integrity. 
The Minister noted that an instance of a legislature overturning a decision of the Executive 
might no1mally pass without a domestic ripple. But the loss of a gove&ument's credibility 
internationally may be real if it appears to be "marching to someone else's drum beat". Such 
a switch may throw foreign policy actors off balance and highlight not only how precariously 
balanced some foreign policy planks are but how dependant practitioners are on predicability 
and no surprises. 
In New Zealand foreign policy has by and large always been the preserve of the gove1nment 
and while parliament and public opinion can influence the process, only rarely has parliament 
made changes to our foreign policy's discretion or impact. Under MMP there will 
undoubtedly be more debate on policy issues and their presentation. The extent to which the 
judiciary may be brought into the picture is unclear but nevertheless worthy of consideration. 
The judiciary and foreign policy 
Attempts to use the courts to circumvent legislative intent on foreign policy are not new. In 
1971 the decision of Parsons v BurlC6 concerned an application under the ancient writ of ne 
exeat regno17 to prevent officials and members of the All Blacks from travelling to South 
Africa on the grounds that the proposed tour would be prejudicial to the interests of New 
Zealand. · 
Is Speech to the Upper Hutt Chamber of Commerce, the Right Honourable Don McKinnon, 4 April1996. 
16 [1971] NZLR 244. 
17 
"That he not leave the Kingdom", Hinde & Hinde New Zealand Law Dictionary, Butterworths 1986. 
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In the final analysis it is pertinent to ask what are the implications of all of this to be for the 
legal profession? 
Implications for the legal profession 
Lawyers are in the business of generating outcomes for clients. This includes changing the 
application of specific law or policy to a client in ·a certain case or changing the law and 
policy in a general area. As the examples to which I have referred show, under MMP "black 
letter law advice" without more is unlikely to be successful in generating positive outcomes 
for clients. 
The policy or political realities of a given situation will become integral to the giving of 
advice. MMP will require black letter law to be considered in the context of the policy and 
political environment concerning that piece of law. In some circumstances that may result 
in advice contrary to the strict letter of the law. The law may allow it, but the political reality 
.may mean it is not wise to do it. 
Lawyers can only hope to give such strategic advice if they see themselves as participants in 
the constitutional system and understand what is happening in that system. Successfully 
influencing policy and legislation-making to achieve desired policy outcomes will require 
lawyers to understand not only the law but also the processes in the practice of how the 
constitutional system in New Zealand really operates. Furthertnore, it will require 
understanding of how public power is really distributed through that system. 
It has been stated that it is vital that lawyers have some input into policy making and learn 
non-judicial ways of getting results. 22 More finely honed dispute resolution techniques, a 
better understanding of how to draft private members bills and learning how to use the select 
committee system effectively, are among the skills successful lawyers will need in the new 
MMP environment. At the heart of this argument is the proposition that MMP will mean 
more opportunity to change legislation as it passes through the House. Primarily this is 
because it will be given more detailed scrutiny by select committees on which a coalition 
government is unlikely to command a majority. 
Lobbying skills for lawyers will become important. Lawyers seeking to change legislation 
on behalf of the clients at the select committee stage will need to learn how to make effective 
written and oral submissions. Alternatively, lawyers acting for government departments or 
SOEs which can be subject to scrutiny or enquiry must establish good channels of 
communication with committee members and make sure they are well-briefed on matters 
which may give rise to an investigation. 
At the recent Dunedin Law Conference, National Party MP and lawyer, Alec Neill observed 
that lawyers need to practice their "lobbying skills". "I'm sorry", he told his audience, "but 
lawyers are not good lobbyists. They're a little verbose, they're a little arrogant, they're 
22 The Independent, "Under MMP lawyers will become pre-emptive lobbyists", August 199S. 
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